Abstract-Wireless LANs carry a mixture of traffic, with different delay and throughput requirements. The usual way to provide lowdelay services is to give priority to such traffic. However, this creates an incentive for throughput sensitive traffic also to use this service, which degrades overall network performance. We show, analytically and by simulation, that the performance of both delay and throughput sensitive traffic can be improved by scaling IEEE 802.11's CW min and TXOP limit parameters in equal proportion. This reduces, but does not eliminate, the incentive for bulk data users to use the low-delay service. We further show that this incentive can be removed, while still giving improved performance to both classes, by reducing the CW min of the high throughput class by a constant that is independent of the traffic load.
INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS networks carry a diverse mix of traffic, from voice with tight delay constraints to bulk file downloads with only long-term throughput requirements. Efficient use of the network requires services tailored to each of these traffic classes. The traditional approach to providing quality of service (QoS) is to prioritize real-time traffic at the expense of data traffic, as done by the default parameter setting of the IEEE 802.11e enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA) standard [1] . This creates an incentive for data applications to use the class intended for real-time users to gain a higher share of resources. This can degrade network performance drastically [17] and QoS differentiation no longer occurs when all data users use the highest priority class [15] . To cope with this, policing mechanisms have been proposed [16] , which increase the complexity of the network.
As an alternative to prioritization, we propose a simple scheme that provides better service for both throughputand delay-sensitive traffic, and encourages applications to use the service designed for them. The approach is based on the IEEE's standard 802.11e [1] for carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance using exponential backoff. Note that we only address "rational" users who try to optimize their performance without changing the network stack (e.g., application writers who optimize their code based on measured performance using all the available services). The issue of "rational" users who modify the wireless interface to gain a higher share of resources has been addressed in previous work. In particular, Cagalj et al. [2] and Galluccio [3] consider selfish users manipulating the backoff parameters and Pelechrinis et al. [4] consider those manipulating the clear channel assessment threshold. Besides, there have been several works addressing selfish users in a variety of other problems rather than service differentiation, such as rate control [5] , [6] , power control [7] , and resource sharing [8] .
To support QoS, 802.11e uses EDCA, in which the access point (AP) selects four access categories (ACs) which stations can use. The ACs use different values of four MAC parameters: CW min , CW max , TXOP limit, and AIF S. CW min controls how long a station waits before transmission and TXOP limit controls how much it can transmit per channel access. Note that applications cannot choose arbitrary combinations of these parameters, but only those permitted by the AP.
The 802.11e EDCA standard recommends four particular combinations of parameters. The parameters for throughput-sensitive bulk data and delay-sensitive voice are shown in Table 1 , taken from [1, Tables 7-37 ]. In particular, the AC for real-time service is given higher priority than that for data service; every parameter is set to a more aggressive value. Because these recommended MAC parameters are static, they will not be good for all traffic loads. As a result, there have been several proposals to improve the performance of EDCA by adapting these parameters dynamically to network conditions. In particular, several works propose to tune CW based on collision rate [9] , [10] or idle channel status [11] . Moreover, Jun et al. [12] tune both CW min and CW max based on collision rate. Due to their adaptiveness, these schemes perform well when network load changes but they require collecting statistics such as collision rate or idle channel status frequently and updating CW accordingly. Note that these schemes are priority-based, which provide higher priority for real-time traffic. The priority-based QoS provision works well provided that the high-priority class is only used by low-throughput real-time traffic. However, when users are rational, this approach creates an incentive for all users to use the class AC_VO, resulting in no QoS differentiation and worse overall network performance.
In this paper, we instead seek to provide service differentiation without prioritizing one class over another, that is, there is no ordering of the classes such that one gets better performance in all respects than the later ones. We do this by choosing ACs such that some parameters are less aggressive whenever others are more aggressive. Our aim is to provide "different but fair" service for different traffic types, by allowing users to choose different points on a throughput-delay tradeoff curve. Our proposal does not require any additional mechanisms such as fair queuing or traffic policing.
Note that fair differentiated service has already been proposed in [19] , [20] , [21] , and [22] for wired networks. This has not been widely deployed, because it requires signals to be sent from the application to the core network. In contrast, for wireless links connected directly to the host running the application, no protocol changes are needed. Prior work in the wireless context can be divided into rewarding schemes [14] , [15] and pricing schemes [17] , [18] . The former approach uses 802.11e's contention-free period (CFP) to provide extra throughput to the data class, which is problematic because current wireless network interface cards do not implement the CFP. The pricing approach either requires micropayments of monetary prices, which makes implementation difficult, or must impose prices through some other form of service degradation such as packet drops, which seems counter-productive.
Our contributions are 1) propose the "proportional tradeoff" scheme that improves service for both traffic types compared to the default EDCA parameters (see Section 2), 2) provide a model of 802.11 WLANs with rational throughput-sensitive and delay-sensitive users (see Section 3) and show that there is still an incentive for data users to use the real-time class (see Section 4), and 3) suggest a simple change to the proportional scheme (called the "proportional incentive adjusted" scheme or "PIA") to give throughput-sensitive applications the incentive to use the bulk-data service while giving improved performance to both classes (see Section 5).
PROPOSED PROPORTIONAL TRADEOFF SCHEME
We propose a mechanism which improves service for both data and real-time traffic by using CW min and TXOP limit. We do not use the AIFS parameter because it provides loaddependent prioritization which makes it difficult to achieve a "fair" service differentiation.
In particular, we define m > 1 service classes, denoted by B k ðk 2 ½1; mÞ. These classes can cover different types of users with different requirements of delay and throughput.
Users which demand higher throughput and can tolerate higher delay can transmit more packets per channel access but less often. To achieve this, class B k with higher k has higher TXOP limit but commensurately higher CW min . This is similar to the method in [13] to ensure fairness. Let T be the TXOP limit of class B 1 , which is chosen to fit one packet at the lowest data rate supported by the standard. Then,
where k ðk ¼ 1; . . . ; mÞ satisfies k < kþ1 and 1 ¼ 1.
Let W B k be the value of CW min used by class B k . Then,
Our scheme provides several classes for different types of traffic; however, to remain simplicity, we only consider in this paper two extreme types of traffic: delay-sensitive and throughput-sensitive traffic. Note that class B 1 is designed for delay-sensitive traffic while class B m is suitable for throughput-sensitive traffic. The logic is that real-time traffic requires low delay and often has only one packet to send at a time but the packet needs to be sent as soon as possible; hence, it always uses class B 1 . In contrast, data sources require high throughput; hence, it may be willing to wait a little longer, if this increases the amount it can transmit per channel access.
We will show below when all data users use class B k , their throughput improves when k increases. When k is appropriately chosen, this scheme improves service for both traffic types. This benefit comes from the reduction of collision probability in the network due to the lower attempt probability of data sources.
MODEL
Here, we present a model of 802.11e EDCA WLANs with rational data and real-time users. Consider an infrastructure network with a set S S of N s ! 1 saturated sources and a set U U of N u ! 0 unsaturated Poisson sources with negligible queuing. (For a discussion of unsaturated sources with nonnegligible queuing, see Appendix B-A2, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http:// doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TMC.2012.179.) Nonsaturated sources represent real-time users while data users are modeled as saturated sources. For simplicity, we make the standard assumption that each station transmits packets of only one source, although this is not required by the scheme itself. (For a discussion of multiple sources per station, see Appendix C, which is available in the online supplemental material.)
The natural framework for considering incentive issues is game theory. WLANs with rational users can be modeled as a game in which users are players. A player i chooses an action which is to use either of classes B k -s. Based on other players' actions and its action, the player i will get a payoff, which is the throughput for a saturated user or the reciprocal of delay for an unsaturated user.
Using class B 1 is a dominant strategy (see [27] ) for unsaturated stations, since it reduces their delay regardless of what other stations do. For this reason, we will not treat unsaturated stations as players, but simply model their effect on the throughput obtained by the saturated users.
In the model, s, s k , and u denote any saturated user, a saturated user using class B k and an unsaturated user.
Let N x ðx 2 fs; s k ; ugÞ denote the number of users of type x. Note that N s ¼ P m k¼1 N s k . Besides, let W x ðx 2 fs k ; ugÞ be the minimum contention window of users of type x. Note that our model considers W x > 11 to guarantee system stability as explained later in Section 3.1.1.
Different nodes may use different physical layer bit rates. To avoid inefficiencies [23] , we aim at time fairness among saturated users, and so measure throughput as the amount of time each can transmit. In addition to the natural measure of the fraction of time (S x , measured in seconds/ second), some of our results apply to the more tractable measure of throughput in seconds/slot, denoted C x . By slot, we mean MAC slot.
Our model makes the standard assumption that the network is in equilibrium. It also assumes that a saturated source sends data for the whole duration of TXOP limit. This is because a saturated source is defined as always having packets waiting to transmit.
Game Framework
A game of the wireless network described above is denoted by a quadruple hP; A; ðu i Þ i2P ; N u i, where . P ¼ f1; . . . ; N s g, the set of players, contains the saturated users. . For every i 2 P, A ¼ fB k : k 2 ½1; mg is the set of actions available to player i, where action B k is to use MAC parameters ðCW min ; T XOP Þ ¼ ðW Bk ; k T Þ (W Bk > W BkÀ1 and k > kÀ1 ). Note that all the players have the same action space. However, the game in Section 4 has a different action space from that in Section 5. . For every i 2 P, the payoff u i ðaÞ is the throughput of player i under the action profile a which is a vector containing the action of every player, (a 1 ; . . . ; a N s ). There are two forms of the game, corresponding to the two types of throughput which are determined using the wireless model in Section 3.1.1 below.
Game 1: u i ðaÞ is throughput in seconds/slot. Then, it is denoted by C i ðaÞ, given by (3). -Game 2: u i ðaÞ is given by throughput in seconds/s. Then, it is denoted by S i ðaÞ, given by (4) . Note that this is a symmetric game [26] , since each player has the same opportunities, and for each player, the same actions yield the same payoffs.
Our results use action profiles defined as follows: 
Wireless Model
We now present the wireless model to determine the throughput of a saturated station as payoff of a player in the game framework, which is derived, justified, and validated in [24] .
The model assumes that sources have no limit on the number of retransmission and CW max . This is made for notational and computational simplicity; however, simulations show that qualitative results from this model still hold when these two backoff parameters are truncated as in the standard.
Sources are indexed in nonincreasing order of their packet duration. That is, T x ! T y for x < y.
The backoff mechanism imposes a slotted structure on time, with slot sizes denoted by a random variable Y . Note that Y is equal to if a slot is idle, to T x if a slot contains a collision involving the source x and only sources y > x with packets no larger than T x , or to T s x if a slot contains a successful transmission of a source x 2 S S [ U U. Note that T x is the time that a one-packet burst sent by a source x occupies the channel.
In each slot, source x ðx 2 S S [ U UÞ attempts to transmit with "attempt probability" x and, conditional on making an attempt, collides with "collision probability" p x . Also let u be the packet arrival rate of an unsaturated station u 2 U U. Central to the model is a set of fixed point equations. We only consider balanced fixed point, i.e., ones in which all the nodes of the same type have same value of collision probability, based on the following observations. The minimum contention window we consider is W x > 11 ðx 2 fs k ; ugÞ, for which binary backoff satisfies the condition of Theorem 5.4 in [25] ; hence, the system has a unique fixed point which is balanced when N u ¼ 0. For N u > 0, we assume that the load of unsaturated users is light enough that there again exists a unique and balanced fixed point as most analyses assume.
Fixed point model. The attempt probability s of a saturated source s is the mean number of attempts per burst divided by the mean number of slots per burst, and satisfies
This is interpreted as one attempt per 1= s slots which is the average number of slots per backoff stage. Note that all saturated users using class B k has the same CW min , W s ¼ W B k and hence, the same attempt probability and collision probability, denoted by sk and p sk , respectively. Next, the attempt probability of an unsaturated source u 2 U U with the arrival rate u is the mean number of attempts of u per second divided by the mean number of slots per second
Finally, the collision probability of source x 2 S S [ U U is the probability at least another source also transmits when a source x transmits
Throughput of data users. The throughput in seconds/slot C s k of a saturated source of class B k is given by the probability the source transmits successfully a burst in a slot multiplied by the duration it can transmit
The throughput in seconds/s S sk of a saturated source of class B k is given by the throughput in seconds/slot divided by the average duration of a slot
Another measure called "relative throughput" is also used. This is the throughput of a saturated source under a given scheme divided by that under the scheme with no service differentiation ( ¼ 1).
PROPERTIES OF PROPORTIONAL TRADEOFF SCHEME
We now consider the first specific game in the foregoing framework, which is based on the proportional scheme to provide service differentiation. An alternative based on PIA will be considered in Section 5.
Under the proportional scheme given by (1), the action space of the game is
and ð k W B 1 ; k T Þ are the MAC parameters of class B k .
Theoretical Results
The following results will be proved for unbounded retransmission and CW max and some results are for networks with only data users. However, we will show by simulation they apply when these assumptions are relaxed.
Service Differentiation Property
We first show that the proportional scheme improves service for both data and real-time traffic by considering the network in which all users use the class designed for them in Theorems 1 and 3. In particular, all saturated sources use class B k>1 and all unsaturated sources use class B 1 . We start with Theorem 1, proven in Section 6.7, which states that, in a network without real-time users, when all data users uses class B k with k > 1 under the proportional scheme, they will receive higher throughput than when there is no service differentiation ( k ¼ 1).
Theorem 1.
Consider the wireless models (2)- (4), in the game hP; A0; ðS i Þ i2P ; 0i with all data users using the same class. The throughput in seconds/s of data users increase when they use class with higher k .
The above theorem is based on the following lemma proven in Section 6.6: Lemma 2. Under the wireless model (2) , in the game hP; A; ðS i Þ i2P ; 0i with all data users using class B k , the collision probability and attempt probability of all data users decrease with the increase of their CW min .
This lemma suggests that under the proportional scheme, when data users use higher class (higher k ), their CW min increases. Therefore, their collision probability reduces, which explains for their throughput increase as stated in Theorem 1.
To show the benefit of the proportional scheme for both data and real-time users, we consider a simple network of mixed traffic in Theorem 3. This theorem is proven in Appendix A, which is available in the online supplemental material, using the wireless model with (2a) simplified to
to keep the algebra tractable, assuming that W s k ) 1.
Theorem 3.
Consider the wireless models (2) and (3) with (2a) replaced by (5), in game hP; A0;
, and T u 1.
. (T3-1). The throughput in seconds/slot of the saturated station increases when k ! 1 increases. . (T3-2). The collision probability of the unsaturated station decreases when k ! 1 increases.
Note that (T3-1) is quite sensitive to modeling assumption and overhead duration.
Although the result in Theorem 1 is for scenarios with only data users and that in Theorem 3 is for a simple mixedtraffic scenario, we show by simulation that they hold for more general scenarios. In particular, simulation shows that the reduction in collision probability is accompanied by a reduction in the mean delay, except at light load.
Incentive Property
Here, we will investigate the incentive of bulk-data users under the proportional scheme by examining different actions of theirs in Theorems 4 and 6.
We start with the following theorem:
Under the wireless models (2)-(4), in the game hP; A0; ðS i Þ i2P ; N u i with W i > 11, a data user using class B 1 has higher throughput than any other data user using any class B k>1 in the same network. Specifically, S 1 ða ðB 1 ;Á;B k!1 ;ÁÞ Þ ! S j ða ðB1;Á;Bk!1;ÁÞ Þ.
This theorem is proven in Section 6.2 and based on the following lemma which is proven in Section 6.1.
Lemma 5. Consider the wireless model (2), in the game
hP; A; ðS i Þ i2P ; N u i with N sj ! 1 and N sjþi ! 1 (i; j > 0). If W jþi ! W j > 11 then data users using class B j have an attempt probability equal to or higher than those using class
The following theorem proven in Section 6.4 states that, regardless of the actions of other data users, the remaining user is better off by using class B 1 : Theorem 6. Consider the wireless model based on (2) and (3) with (2a) replaced by (5) , in the game hP; A0; ðC i Þ i2P ; 0i with W i > 11. We have C 1 ða ðBk>1;ÁÞ Þ < C 1 ða ðB1;ÁÞ Þ: ð6Þ
Although the throughput in Theorem 6 is in seconds/ slot, simulation demonstrates this result still holds for seconds/s. The proof of Theorem 6 is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Consider the wireless model based on (2) and (3) with (2a) replaced by (5) , in the game hP; A; ðu i Þ i2P ; 0i with W s k > W u > 11. Data user 1 has a higher attempt probability and other data users has lower attempt probability when data user 1 uses class B 1 than when it uses any class B k>1 .
This lemma explains for the increase of the throughput of data user 1 when it uses class B 1 as stated in Theorem 6.
Note that an action profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player gets higher payoff by changing its action while others keep theirs unchanged [27] . From Theorem 6, the action profile with all data users using class B 1 is a unique Nash equilibrium. Then, according to Theorem 1, the throughput of a data user at Nash equilibrium is less than that when all data users use class B k>1 . Section 5 will consider an improved scheme that avoids that issue.
From Theorem 6, using class B 1 is a dominant strategy, which means that regardless of actions of other users, a given user always get the highest throughput by using class B 1 . Hence, even if the action space consists of mixed strategies [27] (i.e., randomly selecting a class from a given probability distribution), the action profile with all data users always using class B 1 is still a unique Nash equilibrium.
Simulation Results and Discussion
Recall that the properties of the proportional scheme in Section 4.1 are proved for unbounded retransmission and CW max and some of them are for a network with only data users. Herein we will use simulation (ns-2.33 [28] , [29] ) to validate those in more general scenarios with both data and real-time users, and a limited number of retransmissions.
In simulated networks, unsaturated and saturated sources send packets to AP, using the user datagram protocol. Unsaturated sources have the same packet size and produce Poisson traffic of the same arrival rate. Saturated sources have the same packet size and receive Constant Bit Rate traffic faster than they can transmit. We use the 802.11g parameters in Table 2 . Note that the results also apply if not all users use the same data bit rate, or the network is based on the 802.11b.
For tractability, we only consider two classes (k 2 f1; 2g). The MAC parameters specific to classes B 1 and B 2 in the proportional scheme are given in Table 3 with W B 2 ¼ W B 1 and T ¼ 0:72 ms.
Note that the throughput in simulation results are measured in packets/s, which can be converted to seconds/s by multiplying by the packet duration. At 54 Mbps, this is 345 us for 1,000 bytes, 375 us for 1,200 bytes and 405 us for 1,400 bytes.
Service Differentiation Property
To validate service differentiation property, we consider the network with all users using the class designed for them (N s 1 ¼ 0). Real-time users use class B 1 and data users use class B 2 .
Scenario 1 (N s2 ¼ N u ¼ 1). Fig. 1 shows the throughput of a data user and the collision probability of an unsaturated station. When increases, the throughput increases and the collision probability decreases, which shows the benefit of the proportional scheme. This confirms the result of Theorem 3.
Scenario 2 (N s 2 > 1, N u > 1). To investigate the ability of our scheme to give benefits to both classes of traffic in larger systems, we compare it with the default EDCA parameters (see Table 1 ) within the same scenarios.
The throughput of a data user and the mean delay of a real-time user under the proportional scheme are shown in Fig. 1 . Throughput of a data user and collision probability of a real-time user as a function of class B 2 's TXOP limit in units of
performance metrics under the default setting (see Table 1 ) with all data users using class AC_BE and real-time users using class AC_VO and with all users using class AC_VO are also shown for comparison. In Fig. 2 , the performance metric of the proportional scheme at each and the default setting are divided by that of the proportional scheme at ¼ 1. Note that the actual throughput and mean delay degrade as N s increases; however, the relative performances improve as N s increases.
Since the relative throughput is greater than 1 for > 1 in Fig. 2a , the proportional scheme with > 1 always provides better service for data users compared to no service differentiation ( ¼ 1). This corroborates the result of Theorem 1. Note that the benefit of the proposed scheme increases with contention level in the network. Fig. 2a also shows that the throughput of a data user in the proportional scheme is always higher than that in the default EDCA scheme with all data users using class AC_BE. Moreover, when traffic load is high enough, our scheme significantly improves the throughput of data users compared to the default EDCA setting with all data users using class AC_VO. At light traffic load (e.g., N s ¼ 3), our scheme provides slightly lower throughput for data users but significantly lower mean delay for real-time users than EDCA scheme with all data users using class AC_VO.
In Fig. 2b , when the load is high enough, our scheme with > 1 provides significant improvement in mean delay of real-time users compared to the case of no service differentiation ( ¼ 1). At light load (e.g., N s ¼ 3), the improvement is negligible. This is acceptable because delay only becomes a problem at high load. Fig. 2b also suggests that at each network load, there exists an optimal value of at which mean delay is minimum (e. 12) . This optimal increases with the network load.
Compared with the default parameter setting which prioritizes real-time traffic with all data users using class AC_BE, we expect the performance will be worse for realtime users under the proportional scheme. This is seen in Fig. 2b . However, compared with the default setting with all data users using class AC_VO, our proportional scheme provides much better service for real-time users.
Although the optimal in our proportional scheme depends on traffic load, the majority of the benefit for both data and real-time users is obtained at ¼ 2. Fig. 2 suggests that increasing beyond 6 or 7 does not improve performance significantly, which is because the contention level does not decrease much further then.
Incentive Property
Here, we will investigate the incentive of data users in choosing a class under the proportional tradeoff scheme, by comparing the payoff of a particular data user in different action profiles. We assume real-time users always choose class B 1 .
A class-B 1 user has higher throughput than a class-B 2 user. We simulated the network scenario with ¼ 35 packets/s, l sat ¼ 1,000 bytes, l nonsat ¼ 200 bytes, N u ¼ 6, W B1 ¼ 32, and W B 2 ¼ W B 1 , varied from 2 to 5, and N s ¼ f3; 12; 21g. What we have found is that a data user using class B 1 gains higher throughput than another data user using class B 2 , which confirms the result of Theorem 4.
Nash equilibrium. Our results in Fig. 3 show that a data user achieves higher throughput by using class B 1 regardless of the other data users' choice under the proportional scheme. However, a data user has less incentive to use B 1 in this case than it does to use AC_VO under the default EDCA scheme, because the latter provides a larger increase in throughput relative to AC_BE.
This implies that the action profile in which all data users use the real-time class B 1 is the only Nash equilibrium, which confirms the result of Theorem 6. However, this equilibrium gives a lower throughput than could be obtained when all data users use class B 2 , as shown by the increase in relative throughput with in Fig. 2a . We next investigate a way to avoid this undesirable equilibrium.
INCENTIVE ADJUSTED SCHEME
Section 4.2 showed that for networks with both data and real-time users, our proportional scheme can improve service for both traffic types relative to the scheme with no service differentiation, especially at high load. However, when a small fraction of data users uses class B 1 , their throughput can be slightly improved. Although the improvement is small, measurement-driven application design will still result in class B 1 being chosen by throughput-sensitive applications. However, we will now show a slight modification to the proposed scheme which can eliminate this incentive issue. This is in contrast to priority-based schemes, which require explicit policing or pricing mechanisms [14] , [15] , [17] , [18] .
Description of the Incentive Adjusted Scheme, PIA
We modify the proportional scheme by reducing CW min of class B k>1 by an amount k > 0, which provides higher benefit for users of class B k>j than users of class B j . The reduction in CW min for class B k>1 results in more throughput for a data user when it uses B k>1 compared to when it uses class B 1 , and thus data users have no incentive to use the real-time class B 1 but have incentive to use the class providing the highest throughput B m . Recall that users can only select one of the access classes determined by the AP, and cannot choose arbitrary combinations of parameters. Note that the performance of delay-sensitive users degrades as k increases, and so we would like to use the smallest k such that bulk data users using class B k get a higher throughput than those using class B kÀ1 , regardless of the network load; any larger value of k will increase that benefit but degrade real-time sources' performance. The absolute smallest such k is given in Theorem 8. Importantly, it depends only on k and kÀ1 , and not the number of users of each type in the network. 
data users using B k get higher throughput than those using B kÀ1 . That is, S 1 ða ðBk;Á;BkÀ1;ÁÞ Þ > S j ða ðBk;Á;BkÀ1;ÁÞ Þ.
The above result is proved in Section 6.5. Specifically, under the incentive adjusted scheme PIA, the action space in the game framework has the form
where ðW B1 ; T Þ and ð k kÀ1 W BkÀ1 À 0 k ; k T Þ, respectively, are MAC parameters of class B 1 and B k>1 .
Properties of PIA
In this section, we first use the game framework above to derive some properties of the PIA scheme. Then, we validate these results using ns-2 simulation.
Theoretical Results
Here, the results will be proved for unbounded retransmission CW max and some results are for networks with only data users. However, simulation shows they still apply when these assumptions are relaxed.
Service differentiation property. To show that PIA improves service for data traffic, we consider the network in which all users use the class designed for them in Theorem 9. It states that PIA provides better service for data users at classes with higher k , which is proven in Section 6.7.
Theorem 9.
Consider the wireless models (2)-(4), in the game hP; A1; ðS i Þ i2P ; 0i with all data users using the same class. The throughput in seconds/s of data users increase when they use class with higher k .
The following corollary comes from the above theorem.
Corollary 10. Consider the wireless model based on (2)-(4), in the game hP; A1; ðS i Þ i2P ; 0i with W i > 11 and all data users using class B k . The throughput in seconds/s of each data user using class B k>1 under PIA is higher than that under no service differentiation (all use class B 1 ).
Incentive property. To see if PIA eliminates the incentive for data users to use the real-time class B 1 , we look at their performance under different actions. The following theorem, proven in Section 6.9, implies that the action profile with all data users using the highest class B m is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 11. Consider the wireless model based on (2) and (3) with (2a) replaced by (5), in the game hP; A1; ðC i Þ i2P ; 0i with W i > 11. For any action profiles in which not all data users use class B m , a data user using a class other than B m can improve its throughput by using B m .
Note that this theorem is a natural consequence of Lemma 12. This lemma, proved in Section 6.8, states that, if there exists at least another data user using the class with the index equal to or higher than the class used by a given user, the given user can get a higher throughput per slot by using the highest class, B m .
Lemma 12. Consider the wireless model based on (2) and (3) 
Although the throughput in Lemma 12 is in seconds/ slot, simulation shows that this result still holds for seconds/second.
Under PIA, the action profile with all data users using the highest class B m is the unique Nash equilibrium. Then, according to Corollary 10, the throughput of each data user at this Nash equilibrium is greater than that when all data users use class B 1 . This suggests that PIA achieves the desired goal of providing a scheme in which rational users will all gain improved performance.
Note that, when mixed strategies are allowed, it remains an open question whether the equilibrium in which all users use class B m is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Simulation Results and Discussion
Recall that the properties of PIA are proved for networks with only data users and for unbounded retransmission and CW max . Here, we will use simulation (ns-2.33 [28] , [29] ) to validate those in more general scenarios with both data and real-time users and a limited number of retransmissions. Noticeably, simulation results show that PIA is actually incentive-compatible, which means that using class B m is the best strategy regardless of what other data users choose.
The simulated network in this section is the same as one in Section 4.2. Note that all the results are still valid when 802.11b parameters are used.
Incentive property. We verify here that throughputsensitive users have an incentive to choose class with the highest TXOP limit. We consider the case of three ACs per station: B 1 , B 2 , and B 3 . The MAC parameters specific to these ACs are given in Table 4 with T ¼ 0:72 ms. The results show that a data user obtains higher throughput by using class B 3 than by using B 1 or B 2 , regardless of the choice between B 1 and B 3 of other data users. This validates the result of Theorem 11. The total throughput is maximum when all data users choose class B 3 which is about 22 percent higher than the case when they all choose class B 1 at N u ¼ 4. This ratio becomes larger when N u increases.
Note that the results for the case of two ACs per station (e.g., only B 1 and B 3 classes are available) can also be inferred from Fig. 4 . In particular, a data user always gets higher throughput by using class B 3 , regardless of the choice of other users. This suggests that PIA is incentive compatible, resulting in all data users to choose class B 3 . This property of PIA is even stronger than the one proven in Theorem 11. Note that the throughput improvements reported here are at the MAC layer only and without considering any congestion control mechanism of the higher layers.
Comparison with the default EDCA parameters. We can now compare the performance of the PIA with that of the default QoS classes (see Table 1 ), under the assumption that all users will use whatever class gives them the best performance.
We consider the case of two ACs per station: B 1 and B 2 . The MAC parameters specific to classes B 1 and B 2 are given in Table 3 with W B 2 ¼ W B 1 À 0 , 0 ¼ 4ð À 1Þ, and T ¼ 0:72 ms. In the scenarios considered here, the value of is varied from 1 to 5. The case of no service differentiation ( ¼ 1) is included for comparison.
Note that under the default parameters, all users will use AC_VO, and under PIA, bulk data users will use class B 2 and real-time users will use class B 1 . Fig. 4 . Throughput in packets/s of a data user when it uses classes B 1 , B 2 , and B 3 as a function of the number of competing data users using data class B 3 . The throughput improvement of a data source under the PIA scheme at a given N u is the ratio of the throughput when all data users use class B 3 and the throughput when all data users use class B 1 , which is about 22 percent at N u ¼ 4 and larger when N u increases.
The relative throughput of a data user under PIA is shown in Fig. 5 as functions of for different numbers of data users, N s . For comparison, the throughput under the default parameter setting (see Table 1 ) is also shown. The throughput is again normalized by that of PIA at ¼ 1.
Figs. 5 and 2a show that the throughput increases faster with under PIA than it did under the proportional scheme, which reflects the reduction in CW min . This implies that PIA provides better service for data users than the proportional scheme without service differentiation ( ¼ 1), especially at high load. This is in contrast to the default parameter setting with all data users using real-time class (AC_VO), for which the performance degrades rapidly at high load. For low load (N s ¼ 3), the default setting performs better than our PIA scheme because the more aggressive choice of CW min is better matched to a small number of stations. However, the tradeoff is that the delay performance of real-time users under the default setting is worse than that under PIA.
This improvement in throughput of PIA comes at the expense of increased delay for real-time users. Figs. 6a and 6b show the probability that a packet of a real-time user is successfully transmitted before a given delay, for different and loads N s ¼ 3 and N s ¼ 21. Fig. 6a shows that PIA at both ¼ 2 and ¼ 5 gives a higher probability that a packet is successfully delivered at a given delay than the default setting with all data users using the class AC_VO. This means that the average packet delay under PIA is smaller. In this lightly loaded case, ¼ 2 provides comparable service to ¼ 1 (no service differentiation), and ¼ 5 provides slight degradation compared to ¼ 1, but less than that caused by the default prioritization setting.
In the heavily loaded case of Fig. 6b , the cumulative distribution of delay for the default setting never reaches 1, which indicates a high loss rate. In contrast, PIA has a low loss rate for all values of tested, although some packets have very high delays. In this case, the benefit increases as increases. Together with the result in Fig. 6a , this implies that under PIA, the optimal for real-time users increases with traffic load, as was observed for the proportional scheme. However, even using ¼ 2 for all loads appears to provide improvement over the default parameters.
In brief, although the optimal under PIA depends on traffic load, it is clear that when ¼ 2, PIA provides better service for both traffic types under typical scenarios considered in this section and Appendix B, which is available in the online supplemental material. This implies that when designing a network with an unknown number of users, PIA can be implemented by simply setting ¼ 2 and ¼ 0 ¼ 4. Adaptive schemes that set dependent on the estimated load are possible, but out of the scope of this paper.
PROOFS
In this section, the proofs of all lemmas and theorems in Sections 4.1 and 5 except Theorem 3 are shown.
We first express the mean slot time IE½Y in (4) as follows:
The mean slot time IE½Y can be expressed in terms of the probabilities P i , P s x , and P c x that a given slot contains 1) no transmissions, 2) a successful burst transmission from 
Durations T s x and T x of source x using class B k are
and
where E is the interval during which a station needs to sense channel free before transmitting (e.g., AIFS or DIFS). T sifs and T ack are the durations of SIFS and an ACK packet, and T px is the transmission time of a packet from the source x.
Lemma 5
Proof. From (2a), we have
Next, dividing 1 À p s jþi from (2c) by 1 À p s j from (2c) gives
To simplify notation, define
Substituting 1 À p s jþi and 1 À p s j from (14) into (15) gives
Since W sk > 4 by hypothesis and 1, the coefficient
of in the denominator of (16) is greater than 1 and increasing in . Hence, gð; W Þ is increasing in . Moreover, gð; W Þ is increasing in W . Therefore, from (17), W jþi > W j implies s jþi < s j and W jþi ! W j implies s jþi s j . t u
Theorem 4
Proof. Under the action profile a ðB 1 ;Á;B k!1 ;ÁÞ , we have N s k ! 1, N s1 ! 1, S 1 ða ðB1;Á;Bk!1;ÁÞ Þ ¼ S s1 , and S j ða ðB1;Á;Bk!1;ÁÞ Þ ¼ S sk!1 .
Thus it is required to show S s1 ! S sk under (2)- (4), with strict inequality if k > 1. Dividing S s k by S s 1 from (4) and substituting (15) gives
To show S s1 ! S sk it is sufficient to show that the denominator of (18) is at least as large as its numerator. First, by (2a) and the fact that
To show that (19) is nonnegative, it is sufficient to show that
Under the action space A0 and by hypothesis, W Bk ¼ k W B1 ! W B1 > 4, which satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5. Hence, s1 ! sk , and by (15) , p sk ! p s1 . If k > 1, these inequalities are all strict. t u
Lemma 7
Proof. To see how the attempt probability of the user 1 changes when its action changes from B k to B kþi (i > 0), consider an arbitrary action profile of the form a ðX;Þ for some X 2 A. Then there are a j 6 ¼ 1 and a c which depends on X and a j , such that
By hypothesis, W 1 > 11, whence cW j > 11. Note that subscripts 1, i and i in this proof are to denote the quantities for user 1, i and j. We first prove that there exists a unique solution of the fixed point model and find that solution. We then show how the solution changes with the action choice of user 1.
Since N u ¼ 0 by hypothesis, (2c) implies
From (5),
Replacing 1 À p j and 1 À p i from (23) into (22) gives
This is equivalent to
Substituting (20) and p 1 from (21) into 1 from (5) gives
Note that f 1 is a function of j due to the relation between i -s in the denominator and j given in (25) . Substituting 1 À p j from (23) into 1 À p j from (21) gives
Then, a solution of the fixed point model is any solution to f 1 ð j ; cÞ ¼ f 2 ð j Þ with j 2 ½0; 1. We first prove there exists such a solution and then prove its uniqueness. Now, f 1 ð j ; cÞ and f 2 ð j Þ are decreasing functions of j on ½0; 2=W j , as illustrated in Fig. 7 .
Moreover, at j ¼ 0, we have f 2 ð0Þ > f 1 ð0; cÞ > 0. Besides, let (25); then, gð1Þ ¼ 0 < 1=2. These, together with the fact that gð j Þ is a decreasing function of j (due to k6 ¼1 increasing with j from (25)), imply that f 1 ð j Þ ¼ 0 has unique solution Ã j in (0, 1). Next, to see that the solution to f 1 ð j ; cÞ ¼ f 2 ð j Þ is unique, let fð j ; cÞ ¼ f 1 ð j ; cÞ À f 2 ð j Þ, which is given by
Clearly g 1 ð j Þ is increasing and positive for j 2 ½0; 1Þ. Moreover, g 2 ð j Þ is negative since (5) implies the second term is negative, and the hypothesis W i > 11 for all i implies that cW j ð1 À j Þ > 4ð1 À j Þ > 4 À W j j . Similarly, g 2 is decreasing because its derivative
which uses the fact that 4 À W j 2 j ! 4 À W j j < 0 by (23) and 4 À W j < 0. Thus, fð j ; cÞ is decreasing in j . This implies that the solution to f 1 ð j ; cÞ ¼ f 2 ð j Þ is unique.
We will now investigate how this unique solution changes with the action of user 1. When user 1 changes its action, its CW min (W 1 ) changes, causing the coefficient c in (20) to change. Let j1 and j2 be the solutions to fð j ; cÞ ¼ 0 for c ¼ c 1 and c ¼ c 2 > c 1 , respectively.
It is clear that fð j ; cÞ is also increasing in c; hence, fð j1 ; c 2 Þ > fð j1 ; c 1 Þ ¼ fð j2 ; c 2 Þ ¼ 0. This, together with the fact that fð j ; cÞ is a decreasing function of j , implies that j1 < j2 . Therefore, when c increases or W 1 increases, j increases and 1 decreases.
In particular, c decreases when a 1 changes from B k to B kÀ1 while a j remain unchanged; hence, this change decreases j and increases 1 . t u
Theorem 6
Let i ðaÞ, p i ðaÞ, and W i ðaÞ denote the attempt probability, collision probability and CW min of a player i 2 P under the action profile a. Let j denote any player in P n f1g.
Proof. The successful transmission rate per slot of the data user in accordance with each action profiles a ðB1;ÁÞ and a ðBk>1;ÁÞ , respectively, are given from (3) as follows: From (31) and (32), we obtain (30a) as follows: 
By (3), dividing S s k from (4) by S s kÀ1 from (4), and then substituting (34) and the definition of gives
It remains to show that the right hand side exceeds 1. Dividing 1 À s k by 1 À s kÀ1 with s k and s kÀ1 from (2a) gives
Since ðW Bk ; p sk Þ > ðW BkÀ1 ; p skÀ1 Þ > 1.
The final factor of (36) cancels with the left hand side by (15) , and so the hypothesis W B k > 4 implies
Substituting this into (35) and using the fact that 1 À 2p s kÀ1 > 0 we obtain
À 1Þ, the most right-hand side of (37) is at least 1, which implies that S sk > S skÀ1 . t u
Lemma 2
Proof. To prove that the attempt probability of a data user reduces when its CW min increases, we first find the fixed point and then prove its property when CW min changes. By hypothesis, we will consider the network with
From (38b),
The solution of (38) 
their throughput per second increases in comparison with using class B kÀ1 .
Proof. Consider two networks with N s > 0, identical except that one has all data users using class B kÀ1 and the other has all data users using class B k . Quantities pertaining to the two networks will be designated by subscripts i 2 fk À 1; kg.
From (11) and (2c) with users of the same class,
where N <x is the number of saturated sources with packets no larger than T x . Substituting (40) and (3) into (4) and then dividing numerator and denominator by s i ð1 À p s i Þ i gives
To show S s kÀ1 < S s k , it's sufficient to show that the right hand side of (41) is higher for S skÀ1 than for S sk . Since k > kÀ1 , it is sufficient that both nonincreasing with the increase of si establishes (42a).
Proof of (42b)
Showing (42b) is equivalent to showing the right-hand side of (42b) subtracted by the left-hand side is greater than 0.
Since E > by (12) , to show that (44) is greater than 0, it suffices to show kÀ1 skÀ1 < k sk ; ð45Þ as below. Multiplying skÀ1 and sk from (2a) by kÀ1 and k , respectively, gives
Applying k > kÀ1 and M 2 M 1 to (46) and (47),
By (43),
Substituting those into (46) and (47) implies (45).
Lemma 12
Proof. Consider action profiles a ðB k ;Á;B kþi ;ÁÞ (k < m, i ! 0 and k þ i m) and a ðBm;Á;Bkþi;ÁÞ . To show (9), we first show that 
From (51), (55), and (56), we have (9) . t u
Theorem 11
Proof. Note that the conditions of this theorem satisfy those of Lemma 12.
Consider an action profile with at least one data user using a class other than B m . Choose the data user using the lowest class among all users under this action profile. Then, according to Lemma 12 , that user has incentive to change its action to using class B m to improve its throughput. Therefore, it can be concluded that no action profile in which at least one data user using lower class than B m is a Nash equilibrium. t u
CONCLUSION
It is important to provide differentiated services, without giving all users the incentive to use a "highest priority" class. This paper has shown through both analysis and simulation that allowing users to adjust CW min and TXOP limit in the same proportion provides service differentiation in WLANs. This scheme improves service for both data and real-time traffic, especially at high load. However, it still provides a slight incentive for data users to use real-time class's parameters. This misalignment of incentives can be removed by increasing CW min by a slightly smaller factor than the TXOP limit. Our incentive adjusted scheme has many advantages over prior proposals. It improves service for both data and real-time traffic and provides the correct incentives for application optimizers, while allowing easy implementation: a single set of 802.11e MAC parameters provides tradeoff between throughput and delay over the range of load studied.
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